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I. INTRODUCTION
The global financial meltdown, which emanated in the United
States in late 2007, has caused global economic and financial tectonic
shifts. The world has yet to settle down from these shifts. This is
without doubt the worst financial crisis in over eight decades. It has
not only distressed global economies that were once deemed immune
from such financial predicaments (e.g. Italian sovereign debt stress),
but the magnitude and impact of the crisis has left relatively few national arenas unaffected. Security is definitely not immune.
II. GLOBAL TECTONIC SHIFTS
These global tectonic shifts have exposed some disturbing trends.
One such trend is that our “common global systems” are seemingly
failing us in our hour of need. Common systems, be they global or
country-based, such as, financial systems, health care, management of
resources (oil-gas, food and water), climate change, and political (i.e.
dysfunction in which governments are failing to deliver effective policy and governance), are failing to deliver as they once did. There is
clearly a need to re-invent these global common systems. Another
trend is the seismic global shifts in the movements of international
1
capital. Yet another trend is the drop in the “confidence” of western
2
economic and political systems. This lack of confidence is deeply
rooted in three things: (a) the questioning of whether the western
style international banking and financial systems are properly regulatx
Professor of International Business/Finance and International Affairs, The George
Washington University. Senior Research Fulbright Scholar and Director of the EU Research
Center, The George Washington University.
1
William Speller & Gregory Thwaites, The Future of International Capital Flows, VOX
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7452.
2
David Daokui Li, How China is Managing Western Hostility, INSEAD KNOWLEDGE
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://knowledge.insead.edu/INSEAD-knowledge-how-China-is-managingwestern-hostility-120117.cfm.
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ed and if too much risk-taking is permitted; (b) western governments
appearing not to function much beyond reelection bids and being out
of sync with its people and markets; and (c) the ever increasing income gap between the rich and the other ninety-nine percent in the
3
West, and growing disquiet on the issues of fairness and justice in
4
western markets economies.
III. LINKAGE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS AND SECURITY
The linkages between financial crisis and security are complex
and multifold. This section deals with those linkages from an economic standpoint.

3

See An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings,

DIVIDED WE STAND: WHY INEQUALITY KEEPS RISING, OECD (2011), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/40/12/49499779.pdf.
Over the two decades prior to the onset of the global economic crisis, real disposable
household incomes increased by an average 1.7% a year in OECD countries. In a large
majority of them, however, the household incomes of the richest 10% grew faster than
those of the poorest 10%, so widening income inequality. Differences in the pace of income growth across household groups were particularly pronounced in some of the English-speaking countries, some Nordic countries, and Israel. In Israel and Japan, the real incomes of those at the bottom of the income ladder actually fell compared with the mid1980s. In OECD countries today, the average income of the richest 10% of the population
is about nine times that of the poorest 10% – a ratio of 9 to 1. However, the ratio varies
widely from one country to another. It is much lower than the OECD average in the Nordic and many continental European countries, but reaches 10 to 1 in Italy, Japan, Korea,
and the United Kingdom; around 14 to 1 in Israel, Turkey, and the United States; and 27 to
1 in Mexico and Chile.
Id. at 22. Comparatively,
the emerging economies [EEs] represent a highly heterogeneous group, in terms of economic size, population, levels of per capita income and growth performance over the past
decade. China and India, for example, are among the largest economies and the two most
populous countries in the world, while Argentina and South Africa are considerably smaller economies. Moreover, the EEs have reached different stages of development, with the
variation among their incomes being similar to that among the 34 OECD countries. Their
long-term patterns of development also differ. . . . All EEs have levels of income inequality
significantly higher than the OECD average. Brazil, Indonesia, and, on some indicators,
Argentina have recorded significant progress in reducing inequality over the past 20 years.
By contrast, China, India, the Russian Federation, and South Africa have all become less
equal over time and inequality levels in Argentina and Brazil do remain high. Inequality in
South Africa and Russia has also reached high levels. While the challenge of tackling inequality is common to EEs and OECD countries, the underlying forces of inequality in the
EEs are different from those in the OECD countries. Key sources of inequality include a
large, persistent informal sector, widespread regional divides (e.g. urban-rural), gaps in access to education, and barriers to employment and career progression for women.
Special Focus: Inequality in Emerging Economies, DIVIDED WE STAND; WHY INEQUALITY
KEEPS RISING, OECD, 48-49 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/13/49170475.pdf.
4
Income Inequality in America: The 99 percent, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Oct. 26,
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/10/income-inequality-america.
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A. Background
In the United States, the question that is often asked is whether
the bailing out of financial institutions 5 and the financial stimulus 6 that
7
8
followed were necessary. The simple answer is “yes.” In fact, the

5
In a testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
U.S. Senate, on September 23, 2008, Fed Chairman Mr. Ben Bernanke stated that

the Federal Reserve supports the Treasury's proposal to buy illiquid assets from financial
institutions. Purchasing impaired assets will create liquidity and promote price discovery in
the markets for these assets, while reducing investor uncertainty about the current value
and prospects of financial institutions. More generally, removing these assets from institutions’ balance sheets will help to restore confidence in our financial markets and enable
banks and other institutions to raise capital and to expand credit to support economic
growth.

Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government-Sponsored Entities,
Investment Banks, and Other Financial Institutions: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 110th Congress. 89-93 (2008) (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Chairman Bernanke presented identical testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, on September
24, 2008. Chairman Ben S. Bernanke: U.S. Financial Markets, FEDERAL RESERVE (Sept. 23,
2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080923a1.htm#f1.
6
See Alan S. Blinder & Mark Zandi, Stimulus Worked, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT,
Dec.
2010,
at
14-17,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/12/pdf/Blinder.pdf..
The Fed took a number of extraordinary steps to quell the financial panic. In late 2007, it
established the first of what would eventually become an alphabet soup of new credit facilities designed to provide liquidity to financial institutions and markets. The Fed lowered interest rates aggressively during 2008, adopting a near-zero interest rate policy by year’s
end. It also engaged in massive quantitative easing to bring down long-term interest rates,
purchasing treasury bonds and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities in
2009 and 2010. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation increased deposit insurance
limits and guaranteed bank debt. Congress established the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) in October 2008, part of which was used by the U.S. Treasury to inject muchneeded capital into the nation’s banks. The Treasury and the Fed ordered 19 large financial institutions to conduct comprehensive stress tests in early 2009 to determine whether
they had sufficient capital—and to raise more if necessary. The stress tests and subsequent
capital raising seemed to restore confidence in the banking system. The fiscal (that is, taxing and spending) efforts to end the recession and jump-start the recovery were built
around a series of stimulus measures. Income tax rebate checks were mailed to households
in early 2008; the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed in early
2009; and several smaller stimulus measures became law in late 2009 and early 2010—such
as the Cash-for-Clunkers tax incentive for auto purchases, the extension and expansion of
the housing tax credit through mid-2010, the passage of a new jobs tax credit through yearend 2010, and several extensions of emergency unemployment insurance benefits. In all,
close to $1 trillion, roughly 7 percent of GDP, will be spent on fiscal stimulus. We do not
believe it was a coincidence that the turnaround from recession to recovery occurred in
mid-2009, just as ARRA was providing its maximum impact.
Id. at 14-15.
7
Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.html.
8
See America’s Bail-out Plan, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12305249?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12305249.
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question one should ask is if they were sufficient. The simple answer
here is “no.” One could make a convincing argument in retrospect
that both the bailouts and the Obama stimulus were inadequate and
that more should have been done in both instances.

Source: Stimulus Worked, Finance & Development, December 2010, Vol. 47, No. 4,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/12/Blinder.htm

In Europe, a slight variation of this same question is often asked:
whether the bailing out of financial institutions was enough and if the
9
financial austerity that followed was excessive. The persistence of the

[T]he notion of any bail-out is deeply troubling to any self-respecting capitalist. Against
that stand two overriding arguments. First this is a plan that could work. And, second, the
potential costs of producing nothing, or too little too slowly, include a financial collapse and
a deep recession spilling across the world: those far outweigh any plausible estimate of the
bail-out’s cost. . . . Although $700 billion is a lot—about 6% of GDP—some of it will be
earned back and it is small compared with the 16% of GDP that banking crises typically
swallow and trivial compared with the Depression, when unemployment surged above 20%
(compared with 6% now). Messrs. Bernanke and Paulson also have done well by acting
quickly: it took seven years for Japan’s regulators to set up a mechanism to take over large
broke banks in the 1990s. . . . No government bail-out of the banking system was ever going to be pretty. This one deserves support.

Id.
9
See Günter Coenen et al., Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models 18-19 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/73, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2010/wp1073.pdf.

Temporary fiscal stimulative actions have greater effects on outputs, inflation and real interest rates in the United States than in Europe. . . .The larger effects in the United States
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sovereign debt crisis and its spread in Europe to the point that no
country, except perhaps Germany, has remained unscathed underscores the mismanagement of this crisis by national governments in
the Eurozone and European Union (EU) institutions, such as, the
10
European Central Bank (ECB). It should be noted that coordinating crisis management amongst seventeen Eurozone governments is
difficult at best, especially given that the ECB was technically not allowed to conduct fiscal bailouts of member countries at the onset of
the crisis. While necessary structural reforms (i.e. austerity measures
and tax reforms) were done, there was a severe shortfall in actual cri11
sis management. The 2010 European crisis is still making headlines
12
in 2012.
In both, the United States and Europe, financial bailouts were
absolutely necessary because the alternative – a complete collapse of
financial systems – was not a viable option for developed western style
economic models in their current state.
One can question whether it was right or wrong to bail out certain banks and leave others to collapse, but that question is somewhat
irrelevant. The mortgage-backed securities industry’s collapse reeled
13
into a full crisis of “fear and confidence.” The end game changed
and became about abating market and investor fear as the risks to
14
global instability were too colossal. Financial institutions serve as
the backbone of Western economics systems.15 If there is an absence

could be due to number of factors. . . . First, Europe is more open than the United States,
and therefore the leakage to imports is larger. Second, automatic stabilizers play a larger
role in Europe than in the United States, and therefore the leakage from the discretionary
fiscal stimulus into higher taxes and lower transfers is greater in Europe. Third, the degree
of nominal rigidities is larger in Europe than in the United States, and therefore the effect
of expansionary fiscal actions on the rate of inflation is lower in Europe than in the United
States, leading to smaller downward movement in the real interest rate in Europe than in
the United States under monetary accommodation.

Id.
10

Mark Weisbrot, European Crisis Worsens Due to Economic Mismanagement, EspecialECB, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. (CEPR) (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/
op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/europes-crisis-worsens-due-to-economic-mismanagementespecially-by-ecb.

ly

by

11
12

Id.
Id.

13 Adam Shell, Crisis of Confidence Leads to Fears of Bear Market, USA TODAY (Aug. 9,
2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2011-08-08-correction-or-bear-market_n.htm.
14 James Altucher, Why the Bank Bailouts Were Necessary, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 11,
2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/188040-why-the-bank-bailouts-were-necessary.
15 See Secretary Henry Paulson Answers Student Questions, COLUMBIA BUS. SCH.
NEWSROOM
(Mar.
07,
2011),
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/news/item/7315765/Secretary+Henry
+Paulson+Answers+Student+Questions.
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of properly functioning banks and financial institutions, then every
part of the economic system is in duress i.e. the access to credit, pay16
ment systems, and financing. Properly functioning financial institutions underpin the key support structures for businesses and employ17
ment.
B.

Financial Crisis and United States Military Spending

1. Negative Impact on Security
What are the major effects of the financial crisis for United
18
States’ military expenditures? Without a doubt, one of the biggest
consequences of the international financial crisis, and now the ensuing
economic crisis, is the budgetary problem for the government. There
is justified fear within the United States’ military establishment that in
the wake of the financial and debt crisis, and given the 2012 elections,
they will experience the same kind of profound cuts that occurred at
19
the end of the Cold War. Certain economic realities are inescapable;
Henry Paulson, former Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, sat down with Dean
Glenn Hubbard to discuss a range of topics in front of a packed room of students, faculty,
and staff members on February 24, [2011] at Low Library, [Columbia Business School in
New York]. . . . Addressing the bailout of AIG and other financial institutions, he added:
‘Most people don’t understand how fundamental the financial system is to the economy,
how it’s the backbone of the economy, and it would have been catastrophic if the system
had failed.’

Id.
16 Chris Farrell, Why Bailouts Stink-and Why We Need Them, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/aug2008/pi2008
084_564875.htm.
17
18

Id.
See Recent Trends in Military Expenditure, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST.

(2012), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends.
In the United States, outlays for 'National Defense' plus State Department outlays for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Equipment and Training (IMET)
in 2010 amounted to $698 billion, an increase of 2.8 per cent in real terms. This also represents a considerable slowing of the rate of increase.

Id.
The US military will cut $485bn from its planned spending over the next decade but will
still maintain a larger force than it had before 9/11. After 11 years of significant budget increases, the Pentagon started to outline on Thursday measures to restrain the growth in its
spending, including lower pay increases and higher health insurance premiums for the serving military, base closures and the scrapping of some smaller weapons programmes.
Geoff Dyer, Pentagon To Cut $485bn Over Next Decade, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eedfdbce-4865-11e1-941c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kn2AG2yQ.
19 See Fareed Zakaria, Cut Defense Spending, CNN (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:00 AM),
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/09/cut-defense-spending/.
Everyone in Washington this week is having a nightmare about a guillotine. I’m talking
about the proposed cuts to the Defense Department. If the Congressional supercommission cannot agree on ways to reduce the debt by about $1.5 trillion over 10 years,
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for example, governments are going to experience a decline in their
tax revenues due to the drop in economic activity and unemployment.
If you couple that with essential social expenditures associated with
high, long-term unemployment, you will see rising government ex20
21
penditures. Thus, the government is confronted by two problems.
One is that they have to use declining revenues to fund the deficit,
and second, the national debt continues to rise due to the continuing
22
deficits. This, of course, translates into governments reexamining all
their big programs, and defense programs most certainly are not being
23
left out of the equation. Being an election year (2012), this only exacerbates the problem. Across the board, we are seeing very serious
and deep thought being given to our defense plans and priorities, and
strategic defense reviews are being carried out at every level of the
24
military and security establishment. “Which will effectively mean
that we can expect some reductions to take place in defense expendi25
tures?” Predictably, the first serious phase of defense cuts occurred
in early 2012 when the White House announced “a reshaping and
26
shrinking of the military.” The strategic defense reviews are “not

that pulls the trigger. And half those cuts automatically come from expenditures on national security. . . . After the Korean War, President Eisenhower cut defense spending by
27 percent. Nixon cut the budget by 29 percent after Vietnam. Even Ronald Reagan scaled
back military spending in the 1980s as the Cold War was becoming less tense. And, of
course, as it got over, that process was accelerated by Presidents George H.W. Bush and
Bill Clinton - all of it adding up to a 35 percent decrease in the defense budget by the mid
‘90s.

Id.
20 From Finance to Defence: Adrian Kendry Discusses Paths Linking Financial Crisis to
Security, NATO REVIEW, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Adrian-Kendry/
EN/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Finance].
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defence
Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents, CTR. FOR TECH. AND NAT’L

SEC. POL’Y (2011), http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/New%20Directions.pdf.
25 Finance, supra note 20.
26 See Robert Burns, Obama Unveiling Defense Strategy, Military Cuts, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/obama-defense-strategy-militarycuts_n_1186025.html. “Looking beyond the wars he inherited, President Barack Obama on
Thursday launched a reshaping and shrinking of the military. . . . [T]he changes won’t come
without risk, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said. But he called it acceptable and, because of
budget restraints, inevitable.” Id. “The Pentagon unveiled a 2013 budget plan that would cut
$487 billion in spending over the next decade by eliminating nearly 100,000 ground troops,
mothballing ships and trimming air squadrons in a bid to create a smaller, agile force with a new
strategic focus.” David Alexander & Jim Wolf, Pentagon Cuts Reshapes Military, Trim Costs,
REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-usa-defense-budgetidUSTRE80P1SP2012012.
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only about how much money will be spent, but also about how it will
27
be spent.”
The large equation that has to be solved is the balance that must
be had between (a) “providing the money to meet the current operations where forces and equipment are needed to meet operational
requirements, and (b) the question about what money is needed for
28
future programs and future commitments.” “The trade-off between
these two [opposing forces is] something that is heatedly debated [in
29
Washington D.C.].” For example, there is a rigorous debate over
whether to focus on various naval programs or aircraft programs; and
choices over manned aircraft programs versus unmanned aircraft programs.
2. Positive Impact on Security
From a security standpoint, however, there are some positives of
the financial crisis: the two that standout are that armed forces recruitment is on the rise and that very deep defense cuts are unlikely
30
given fears of terrorism networks and increased tensions with Iran.
Moreover, it is important to remember that the United States’
31
debt problem of over fifteen trillion is very different than that of the
32
33
European sovereign debt crisis. United States’ debt is in part struc27
28
29
30

Finance, supra note 20.
Finance, supra note 20.
Finance, supra note 20.
Jim Michaels, Military Recruitment Seen Rising Amid Job Woes, USA TODAY (Nov.

18, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-11-18-recruiting_N.htm.
31 The U.S. Public debt is $15.2 trillion. The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It,
TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited
Jan. 28, 2012) (search debt for specific date by using “Daily History Search Application”).
32 This is particularly true for the seventeen Eurozone countries. See Map of Euro Area
1999-2011, EURO. CENT. BANK, http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/map.en.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2012). “17 Member States of the European Union use the euro as their currency” (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, The
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland). Id. Non-participants are
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and
the United Kingdom; they are European Union Member States, but they do not currently use
the single European currency. Id.
33 See European Public Debt At A Glance, CNN (July 21, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/
2011/BUSINESS/06/19/europe.debt.explainer/index.html.
Fourteen out of 27 countries in the European Union had public debt exceeding 60% of
their gross domestic product at the end of 2010, according to official statistics. The report
by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, showed that the ratio of government debt to GDP across all 27 member states increased from 74.4% in 2009 to 80.0% in
2010. For the 17 euro zone countries, the debt is even higher, increasing from 79.3% in
2009 to 85.1% last year. Topping the European debt league is Greece with 142.8% government debt to GDP ratio, followed by Italy (119.0%), Belgium (96.8%) Ireland (96.2%),
Portugal (93.0%), Germany (83.2%), France (81.7%), Hungary (80.2%), and the United
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tural but is also in part event driven. The four key events that almost
doubled the size of the debt in a very compressed period of time were
34
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the financial bailout and stimulus.
The United States has the ability to reduce, and, in fact, eliminate the
debt if it so chooses; but the current political deadlock and dysfunc35
tion is preventing this from occurring. The southern Europeans,
however, have what is known as a classic, old-fashioned third-world
36
debt problem. They borrowed too much and do not have the actual
37
money to pay it back. Moreover, the austerity program placed in
many Eurozone countries and the United Kingdom are ensuring little
and flat growth rates of approximately one percent over the short- to
38
medium- term. Thus, despite the United States Federal Reserve’s
Kingdom (80.0%). The lowest government debt to GDP ratios were recorded in Estonia
(6.6%), Bulgaria (16.2%) and Luxembourg (18.4%), according to the Eurostat report.
Under the Stability and growth pact, agreed when the euro began in 1999, member states
are supposed to ensure their debt does not exceed 60% of their GDP.

Id.
34 See Tom Blummer, AP Claims Bush Tax Cuts Caused National Debt to Grow by $1.6
Trillion, NEWSBUSTERS (July 17, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/tom-blumer/

2011/07/17/ap-claims-bush-tax-cuts-caused-national-debt-grow-16-trillion.
How did the debt grow from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to its current $14.3 trillion? The biggest
contributors to the nearly $9 trillion increase over a decade were: (a) 2001 and 2003 tax cuts
under President George W. Bush: $1.6 trillion, (b) Additional interest costs: $1.4 trillion,
(c) Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: $1.3 trillion, (d) Economic stimulus package under
Obama: $800 billion, (e) 2010 tax cuts (these weren't cuts at all; they were really a continuation of the current income tax structure -- Ed.), a compromise by Obama and Republicans
that extended jobless benefits and cut payroll taxes: $400 billion, (f) 2003 creation of Medicare's prescription drug benefit: $300 billion, (g) 2008 financial industry bailout: $200 billion, (h) Hundreds of billions less in revenue than expected since the Great Recession began in December 2007, and (i) Other spending increases in domestic, farm and defense
programs, adding lesser amounts.

Id.
35 The Debt-Ceiling Deal: No Thanks to Anyone, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21525446; Meet the Press Transcript for August 7, 2011:

Kerry, McCain, Greenspan, Maddow, Castellanos, MSNBC (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/44050464/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-transcript-august/#.T23nPjGmiHc
(Mr. Greenspan states: “the United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print
money to do that”).
36 See Greek Bondholders Won’t Be Paid, For Now: Transcript of Interview with Scheherazade Rehman, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (NPR) (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/
01/147752406/greek-bondholders-wont-be-paid; New Efforts to Bail Out Greece: Transcript of
Interview with Scheherazade Rehman, THE DIANE REHM SHOW (Feb. 21, 2012),

http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-02-21/new-efforts-bail-out-greece/transcript.
37 See Greek Bondholders Won’t Be Paid, supra note 36; New Efforts to Bail Out Greece,
supra note 36.
38 See Recession 'To Return' To Europe, Say Economists, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011, 7:39
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16361047.
Growth in Europe has slowed in recent months as the eurozone debt crisis has forced governments to rein in spending and has undermined confidence in global financial markets.
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pessimistic outlook for the United States economy for 2012-2013,
communicated in the form of an announcement that interest rates will
39
remain low and unchanged until 2014, comparatively, from a United

The eurozone economy grew by 0.2% between July and September, while the 27 economies of the European Union grew collectively by 0.3%.

Id.
The International Monetary Fund sharply lowered its global economic outlook today and
warned that an intensified euro crisis could tip the world back into recession. Its latest
forecast is for the world to grow 3.3% this year and the advanced countries 1.2%, sharply
lower than it saw just four months ago. Those numbers, it warns, are predicated on a comprehensive solution to Europe’s crisis. In the euro zone, Germany, France, Spain and Italy
all managed to reduce their structural budget deficits, the latter three thanks to austerity.
All are expected to reduce those deficits further this year. But this is not the good news it
seems. Austerity, the IMF has found, could be making Europe’s crisis worse, rather than
better.
G.I., The IMF’s Latest Forecast, Perverse Austerity, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Jan 24, 2012,
8:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/01/imfs-latest-forecast-3.
39 Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125a.htm.
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December [2011]
suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately, notwithstanding some slowing
in global growth. While indicators point to some further improvement in overall labor
market conditions, the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending has continued to advance, but growth in business fixed investment has slowed, and the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has been subdued in recent months, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects
economic growth over coming quarters to be modest and consequently anticipates that the
unemployment rate will decline only gradually toward levels that the Committee judges to
be consistent with its dual mandate. Strains in global financial markets continue to pose
significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee also anticipates that
over coming quarters, inflation will run at levels at or below those consistent with the
Committee’s dual mandate. To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure
that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. In particular, the
Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. The Committee
also decided to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September. The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed
securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. Voting for the FOMC monetary policy
action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A.
Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Daniel K. Tarullo; John
C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who
preferred to omit the description of the time period over which economic conditions are
likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate.

Id.
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States’ perspective, the defense cuts would be significantly smaller
40
than what is forecasted in Europe.

Source: Robert, Lance. US Debt to GDP Hits 98.9% and Rising, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov.
17, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-11-17/markets/30409247_1_debt-growthdebt-ceiling-financial-crisis.

IV. FINANCIAL CRISIS, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The linkage of “economic desperation” (measured through poverty on the individual’s level and various economic indicators on the
societal level) and security issues (terrorism, extremism, nationalism,
xenophobia) has been investigated in-depth in the post 9-11 era - es41
pecially the link between poverty and terrorism. It is important to

40 See James Blitz, Western Alliance: European Cutbacks Raise US Concerns, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7906184-d7c8-11e0-a06b-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1ko
4JiCtm.

A fundamental driver of US worries about Europe’s military capability is the extent to
which European states are cutting back on defence spending. The US, to be fair, faces its
own budgetary pressures and is cutting the Pentagon budget. But the pace at which Europe has moved to slash military budgets is striking. As Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Nato
secretary-general, said in a speech in February, Europe has in the past two years reduced
defence spending by a figure equivalent to the value of the annual German defence budget.

Id.
41 Alberto Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Res. (NBER), Working Paper No. 10859, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w10859.pdf?new_window=1; Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 24, 2002), http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/91841/
does-poverty-cause-terrorism.
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note that this line of investigation is inundated with contradictions
42
and complexities arising from national interests.
The discussion can be made simple using data that shows “suicide
bombers . . . come from lower socioeconomic groups when compared
43
to other, non-suicidal, terrorists, or made more complex if one considers that the linkage between terrorism and poverty is too simple,
and often incorrect. Instead, the links have to do with the structure of
rewards and systems of incentives that evolve in many societies. And
the role of economics in fighting terrorism can involve far more than
trying to disrupt financial networks. Terrorism, and the measures
taken to counter terrorism, both carry economic costs. Yet terrorism
does have economic sources, and the attempt to offset, and even defeat, terrorism would benefit from the adoption of economic strategies. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to pin
44
down.
This debate can become hideously complicated if one asks the ultimate central question regarding the security-development nexus whose security we are talking about? Failure to adequately distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict contributes to the vagueness of statements about ‘security’ being furthered
by development and vice versa. While it is of course undeniable that
states ravaged by internal conflict will face substantial development
difficulties, this is a very different issue from using ‘development’ to
make donor country citizens feel less insecure at home in the North.
All too often the development-security nexus exists to manipulate
development for ‘them’ with the ultimate purpose of enhancing security for ‘us’. This approach is not only a rewriting of the aims of ODA
[official development assistance] but is also potentially dangerous and
self-defeating, tearing huge holes in the overall development goals of
45
progress, prosperity and peace, or for that matter, “turning development into a vehicle for security may actually make the latter more
46
elusive.”

42

Krueger, supra note 41.
Claude Berrebi, Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty, And Terrorism
Among Palestinians (Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper No. 477,
2003), available at http://webarchives.cdlib.org/wayback.public/SUL_ag_2/20100421001309/
http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/477.pdf.
44 David Gold, Some Economic Considerations in the U.S. War on Terrorism, 3 THE
QUARTERLY JOURNAL 1 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
imported/projects/arms/study/GoldConnections.pdf.
45 Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfelllow & James Putzel, Introductory Article: On The Discourse
Of Terrorism, Security, and Development, 18 J. INT’L DEV. 1, 51-67 (2006).
43

46

Id.
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In spite of this confusion about poverty and security, we ultimately understand that the lack of development, increasing poverty and
the increasing gap between the rich and poor, and the hopelessness of
bettering one’s own or one’s children’s future are detrimental to na47
tional security (everyone’s national security).
Approximately 1.2 billion of the seven billion world population
48
lives in abject global poverty (one dollar a day or less). The financial
crisis added fifty-three million more people living on less than two
49
dollars a day or less, as many more individuals become more de50
pendent on foreign aid and remittances from families abroad. The
arenas of foreign aid and remittances are two areas that not only suffer after a lag in the aftermath of a financial crisis, but whose impacts
51
are much longer term. The G8 nations had committed to double
52
foreign aid spending by 2010. The financial crisis has significantly

47 Frances Stewart, Development and Security (Ctr. for Research on Inequality, Human
Sec. and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper No. 3, 2004), http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/
workingpaper3.pdf.
48 See Freedom From The Want, UNITED NATIONS 19 (2000), http://www.un.
org/millennium/sg/report/ch2.pdf. “Nearly half the world’s population still has to make do on
less than $2 per day. Approximately 1.2 billion people-500 million in South Asia and 300 million
in Africa- struggle on less than $1.” Id.
49

Id.

50

ALEXIS ARIEFF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40778, THE GLOBAL ECON.
CRISIS: IMPACT ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA & GLOBAL POL’Y RESPONSES 12 (Aug. 25, 2009),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128815.pdf.
51 The Group of Eight is a forum for the governments of the seven of the world’s leading
industrialized nations, and Russia: United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
the United Kingdom. In 1997, the group (then G7) added Russia, thus becoming the G8. The
European Union is represented, but cannot host or chair the G8.
With no headquarters, budget or permanent staff, the Group of Eight is an informal but
exclusive body whose members set out to tackle global challenges through discussion and
action. . . . The leaders of these countries meet face-to-face at an annual summit that has
become a focus of media attention and protest action. The G8's roots lie in the oil crisis
and global economic recession of the early 1970s, and was created by France in 1975.

Profile G:8, BBC WORLD NEWS (June 26, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
country_profiles/3777557.stm.
52 See Aid Statistics, OECD (2012), http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649_
34447_46582641_1_1_1_1,00.html.
Aid flows from OECD Development Assistance committee (DAC) donor countries totaled
USD 129 billion in 2010, the highest level ever, and an increase of 6.5% over 2009. This
represents about 0.32% of the combined gross national income (GNI) of DAC member
countries. Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa was USD 29.3 billion, of which USD 26.5 billion was for sub-Saharan Africa. These amounts represent an
increase in real terms of +3.6% and +6.4% respectively over 2009. However, excluding
debt relief grants, bilateral ODA fell slightly (-0.1%) for Africa but rose (+1.7%) for subSaharan Africa. According to recent analyses, Africa is likely to receive less than half of
the USD25 billion increase envisaged at Gleneagles, mainly a result of the underperformance of some European donors.
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53
slowed down the progress to fill that obligation. In addition, we
54
have seen a resurgence of spikes in food prices. Food price indices
have increased nineteen percent from September 2011 to early 2012
55
and we are in the midst of yet another food crisis. Among the many
reasons for this are the floods in Thailand (floods that occurred in
56
July 2011). The horn of Africa currently has over 13.3 million peo57
ple hungry – to the point of starving. Food prices dipped slightly in
58
2012, but prices are very volatile.

Id.; see also Development: Aid Increases, But With Worrying Trends, OECD (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidincreasesbutwithworryingtrends.htm
53 Larry Elliot, G8 Has Hit a Cynical Low on Aid, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/25/g8-cynical-low-aid.
54 FAO Food Price Index, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 9,
2012) http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/.
55 See Food Price Watch, WORLD BANK (Nov. 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTPOVERTY/Resources/336991-1311966520397/Food-Price-Watch-November-2011.htm.
Global food prices remain high even though the World Bank global Food Price Index remained unchanged between July and September 2011. Despite dipping marginally in September 2011 by 1% and settling at 5% below its February 2011 peak, the food price index is
still 19% above its September 2010 levels. . . . There is general consensus that high and
volatile global prices will continue in the medium term due to structural factors. The recent
2011 State of Food Insecurity report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) argues that rapidly growing economies and populations; increasingly intertwined relations between food prices and energy prices; and increasing production of biofuels are all structural
factors affecting both volatility and high prices. Similarly, high domestic price volatility is
also likely to continue.

Id.
56

See id.

Rice markets will need to be monitored closely because the Thai Rice Mortgage Scheme
has increased export prices of Thai rice (5% broken), which went up from an average of
US$566 in August to US$598 in September. A number of analysts continue to expect further price rises in the coming months. In addition, recent floods in Thailand -- the worst in
50 years -- may bring further uncertainty in the short run following production losses estimated at 4-6 million tons of rice (or about 16-24% of the forecasted total production). The
flooding has affected the north, northeast and central regions of the country, with 2.4 million people affected and substantive extensions of farm lands covered by water. Floods are
hampering shipments (although news of defaults has not yet been received) and are reported to have destroyed a number of rice warehouses and mills.

Id.
57

See id.

The crisis in the Horn of Africa continues to affect over 13.3 million people in the region.
This is an additional million people since the last Food Price Watch in August. Famine continues in Somalia and it was declared in the southern Bay region on September 3. An estimated 50,000 people from primarily poor agropastoral households in Gedo and Juba and
pastoral households in Bakool also face famine-level food deficits. The number of people
facing a humanitarian crisis in Somalia has risen to 4 million; 750,000 are at risk of death
due to famine in the next four months "in the absence of adequate response.

Id.
58

FAO Food Price Index, supra note 54.
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By mid-2008, international food prices had skyrocketed to their
highest level in 30 years. This, coupled with the global economic
downturn, pushed millions more people into poverty and hunger. In
December 2010, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
food price index rose above its 2008 peak. The index dropped to an
11-month low in October 2011, but food prices still remain generally
59
higher than last year and are very volatile.

Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization 2012, http://www.fao.org/isfp/isfphome/en/.

High and volatile domestic food prices require households to
formulate coping strategies (borrow money from other family members to buy food, eat less, get additional jobs, eat whatever food is
available i.e., cheaper and less preferred food, buy food on credit,
60
61
etc.). These tend to increase conditions that are detrimental (i.e.,
economic deprivation) to national security.
59 FAO Initiative On Soaring Food Prices, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (2012), http://www.fao.org/isfp/isfp-home/en/.
60 U. Usfar, Fahmida & J. Februhartanty, Household Food Security Status Measured by

the US-Household Food Security/Hunger Survey Module (US-FSSM) Is In Line with Coping
Strategy Indicators Found in Urban and Rural Indonesia, 16 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION
available
at
2,
368-74
(2007),
http://apjcn.nhri.org.tw/server/APJCN/Volume16/vol16.2/Finished/Usfar(368-374).pdf; Anders
Petersson, et al., Food Security in the Northern, Eastern and North Central Provinces: A Food
WORLD
FOOD
PROGRAMME
(Apr.
2011),
Security
Assessment
Report,
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp243519.pdf.
61 Media Brief: Costing Lives: The Devastating Impact of Rising and Volatile Food Prices,
SAVE THE CHILDREN (Oct. 2011), http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/
files/docs/Costing%20Lives.pdf. Studies on the impact of food price increases on nutrition after
2006 estimate annual increases in hunger for 63–91 million people, depending on the period
analyzed. Sailesh Tiwari & Hassan Zaman, The Impact of Economic Shocks on Global Undernourishment (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5215, 2010), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/02/23/000158349_20
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A. Transmission of Financial Crisis and The Threat to National
Security
The 2007+ global financial crisis and the subsequent European
sovereign debt crisis spread and contaminated various regions of the
62
world through four main transmission mechanisms with lags. The
first transmission occurred from the United States to all major developed countries via the financial markets, as global financial markets
are not only electronically connected at the speed of light, but also
through a collective interconnected mindset among traders and mon63
ey managers. This type of transmission can occur within hours due
64
to electronic trading. A second type of transmission occurs through
65
trade flows. This takes a longer period of time - perhaps six months
or more and ultimately impacts the medium - and long-term devel66
opment of an economy. The third type of financial contamination
67
occurs in through remittances. About three percent of the World’s
population (more than 215 million people) reside outside their birth
country, and more than “700 million migrate within their countries.
Remittances, the money sent home by migrants, are three times the
size of official development assistance and they provide an important
lifeline for millions of poor households. Remittances to developing

100223161348/Rendered/PDF/WPS5215.pdf.; Hink-Jan et al., High Food Prices and the Global
Financial Crisis Have Reduced Access to Nutritious Food and Worsened Nutritional Status and
Health, 140 J. OF NUTRITION 153S,161S (Jan. 2010), available at http://jn.nutrition.org/
content/140/1/153S.full.
62 Ravi Balakrishnan, et al., The Transmission of Financial Stress from Advanced to
Emerging Economies 1 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/133, June 2009), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09133.pdf.
63 For example, if a panic begins in the Asia stock market, it will spill over into Europe as
the markets open and the American stock market could actually be crashing before the market
opens in pre-market trading.
64 Nidal Rashid Sabri, Roots of Stock Market Volatility and Crisis: A Synthesis and Suggested Solutions, in INT’L FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND SHOCK VOLATILITY: ISSUES AND
REMEDIES 14-15 (2002); Pelin Berkmen, et al., The Global Financial Crisis: Explaining CrossCountry Differences in the Output Impact (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.09/280,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09280.pdf.
65 Roberta De Santis, Had Trade any Importance in the Transmission of Currency Shocks:

An Empirical Application for New EU Member States from Central and Eastern European
Countries (European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper No. 28,
2004), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/6733/1/1132_28.pdf; Kristin J. Forbes, Are Trade Linkages
Important Determinants of Country Vulnerability to Crises?, in PREVENTING CURRENCY
CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS (Sebastian Edwards & Jeffrey A. Frankel eds., 2002), available
at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10634.pdf.
66 Shan-Chi Gong, et al., Crisis Transmission: Some Evidence from the Asian Financial
Crisis, 13 INT’L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 463 (Issue 4, 2004); Forbes, supra note 65.
67 Berkmen, supra note 64; Massimiliano Cali &Salvatore Dell’Erba; The Global Financial
Crisis and Remittances: What Past Evidence Suggests (Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper No. 303, 2009), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/4408.pdf.
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countries are estimated to reach $351 billion in 2011.” 68 There is gen69
erally a longer lag time for this type of transmission. The last mechanism of financial stress transmission occurs through foreign aid and
tends to have the longest lag time of the cotangent - perhaps up to a
70
year or more. In the 2007+ crisis, it was the transmission of trade,
remittances, and foreign aid that mainly impacted emerging markets
and developing economies.
1. Trade and Security
The impact on trade in the aftermath of any financial crisis
(banking or currency crisis) is well documented.71 Generally, empirical studies show that “the effects of financial crises on international
trade . . . [are] that banking crises [have] had a negative impact on
imports but a positive impact on exports, in the short term, whereas
currency crises [have] decreased imports in the short term and stimu72
lated exports in the longer term.” The impact on trade in the aftermath of the current global financial crisis was perhaps the most damaging and is longer-lasting than any other crisis over the last thirty

68 Migration and Remittances, THE WORLD BANK (2012), http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20648762~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theS
itePK:4607,00.html.

Remittances sent home by migrants accounted for 2 percent of GDP for all developing
countries in 2008, but 6 percent of GDP for low-income countries in particular. In several
small low-income countries, remittances exceed a fifth of GDP and provide the largest
source of foreign exchange. Remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries
are three times the size of official development assistance and represent a lifeline for the
poor. In 2010, remittances recovered to the 2008 level of $325 billion after having dropped
to $307 billion in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. Flows are projected to rise to
$346 billion in 2011 and $374 billion by 2012. Remittances generally reduce the level and
severity of poverty. They frequently lead to higher human capital accumulation, higher
health and education expenditures and access to information and communication technologies, more involvement in private enterprise; reduce child labor; and help households be
better prepared for natural disasters. Governments should treat remittances like private
transactions and not as a substitute for debt or aid flows. Diasporas can be an important
source of trade, capital, technology, and knowledge for origin countries. Their savings and
wealth can be leveraged for development projects through diaspora bonds and remittancebacked bonds.

Id.
69 Scheherazade Rehman, GW Korea Global Forum Speech on “Financial Crisis and
Asia” (Mar. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
70 Martin Kohr, Statement at the UN General Assembly Extraordinary Thematic Dialogue on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development, SOUTH
CENTRE (Mar. 25, 2009) http://www.africafocus.org/docs09/gec0904a.php.
71 De Santis, supra note 65; Forbes, supra note 65.
72 Zihui Ma & Leonard Cheng, The Effects Of Financial Crises On International Trade,
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Dec. 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10172.pdf?new_
window=1.

136

FIU Law Review

[7:119

73
years (see chart below). It not only slowed the growth of almost every country in the world, but also significantly slowed the fastest grow74
ing economies of China and India. For example, China’s and India’s
change in merchandise export levels between February 2008 and Feb75
ruary 2009 were -25.7% and -22.4%, respectively.

Source: Economic Letter – Insights From the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, Vol. 4, no. 8 (Nov. 2009), http://dallasfed.org/research/
eclett/2009/el0908.html

Over the last several decades, from an economist standpoint, we
have seen “a period of increasingly outwardly orientated policies, i.e.

73 Mark A. Wynne & Erasmus K. Kersting, Trade, Globalization, and the Financial Crisis,
4 FED. RES. BANK DALLAS 8 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/
46567046_Trade_globalization_and_the_financial_crisis.
74 James Lamont & Jamil Anderlini, India and China Voice Growth Fears, FIN. TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5437b324-265c-11e1-85fb00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oO66
QG5f.
75 DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40496, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS:
FOREIGN AND TRADE POLICY EFFECTS (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R40496.pdf.
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globalization.” 76 A “pullback from these types of policies would be a
77
serious concern” in a new era of not only slow and flat growth in the
developed world, but slower growth in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, In78
dia, and China) countries. It “would be the wrong lesson to take
from the crisis. Certainly globalization played a central role, in terms
79
of the propagation” and cotangent of the global spread of the crisis
and “how synchronized the global economic downturn has been, but
at the same time, that should not overshadow all the benefits that
80
globalization has brought” over the last three decades.
“The challenge for us will be how to manage the risks of globalization, while tapping into its enormous benefits - an on-going balanc81
ing act.” What one would like to see, “obviously, [are] policies moving in a direction consistent with globalization rather than a retrenchment away from globalization . . . which . . . ultimately would do
82
more to harm the global economy in the long run.” In turn, any
movement in the direction of protectionism and less transparency
would ultimately impact security negatively. 83
2. Remittances and Security
As a result of the financial crisis, the World Bank estimated that
global remittances dropped by approximately 5.5 percent in 2009 and
84
12 percent in 2010. It should be noted that remittances have in85
creased in 2011. Officially recorded remittance flows to developing
countries were estimated at $351 billion in 2011, this is an 8 percent
86
increase from 2010.
Growth of remittances in 2011 exceeded the earlier expectations
in four regions, especially in Europe and Central Asia (due to higher

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Finance, supra note 20.
Id.
Lamont, supra note 74.
Finance, supra note 20.
Finance, supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
10 Benefits Of The WTO Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2008),

http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/10b_e.pdf.
84 THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACT BOOK 2011 19 (2d ed.
2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011Ebook.pdf.
85

Id.

86

Sanket Mohapatra, Dilip Ratha & Ani Silwal, Outlook For Remittance Flows 2012-14:
Remittance Flows To Developing Countries Exceed $350 Billion In 2011, MIGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT BRIEF #17 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TOPICS/
Resources/214970-1288877981391/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief17.pdf. This is the first increase since the commencement of the global financial crisis. Id.
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outward flows from Russia that benefited from high oil prices), and
Sub-Saharan Africa (due to strong south-south flows and weaker cur87
rencies in some countries that attracted larger remittances). By contrast, growth in remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
was lower than previously expected, due to continuing weakness in
88
the United States’ economy and Spain. Flows to the Middle East
89
and Africa were also impacted by the “Arab Spring.”

Source: THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACT BOOK 2011 19 (2nd
ed.
2011),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf.

Following this rebound in 2011, the growth of remittance flows to developing countries is expected to continue at a rate of 7-8 percent annually to reach $441 billion by 2014. Worldwide remittance flows,
including those to high-income countries, are expected to exceed $590
billion by 2014. However, there are serious downside risks to this outlook. Persistent unemployment in Europe and the United States is
affecting employment prospects of existing migrants and hardening
political attitudes toward new immigration. Volatile exchange rates
and uncertainty about the direction of oil prices also present further
90
risks to the outlook for remittances.
A number of countries are heavily dependent on the flow of remittances as a percentage of their Gross National Product (GDP).

87
88
89
90

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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For example, in 2009, in Tajikistan, remittances comprised 35.1 percent of GDP, Tonga 27.7 percent, Lesotho 24 percent, Moldova 23
percent, Nepal 22.9 percent, Lebanon 22.4 percent, and Honduras
91
19.3 percent. The countries which were the highest recipients of remittances, in 2012, were India $55.1 billion, China $51.0 billion, Mexico $22.6 billion, Philippines $21.3 billion, France $15.9 billion, Germany $11.6 billion, Bangladesh $11.1 billion, Belgium $10.2 billion,
92
Spain $10.2 billion, and Nigeria $10 billion. This data is interesting
as a large portion of remittances inflow can be explained by diaspora
93
(“any group migration or flight from a country or region” ) in large
94
European countries working in other countries.
The top ten remittance senders, in 2009, were as follows: the
United States, ($48.3 billion), Saudi Arabia ($26.0 billion), Switzerland ($19.6 billion), Russian Federation ($18.6 billion), Germany
($15.9 billion), Italy ($13.0 billion), Spain ($12.6 billion), Luxembourg ($10.6 billion), Kuwait ($9.9 billion), and t he Netherlands
95
($8.1 billion). The top ten remittance senders, in 2009, as a percentage of GDP, were as follows: Luxembourg (20.1% ), Lebanon
(17.0% ), Oman (9.9% ), Maldives (8.9% ), Kuwait (8.2% ), Bahrain
(6.6% ), Saudi Arabia (6.5% ), Guinea-Bissau (5.4%), Guyana
96
(5.2% ), a n d Tonga (4.3% ).
Moreover, by and large, over 50 percent of those who are working overseas (and send money home) hold jobs in developed coun97
tries and are in what is generally recognized as vulnerable employment.98 Workers in such employment most typically do not have any
91

THE WORLD BANK, supra note 84.

92

Id.
Diaspora

93

Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/diaspora (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
94 Suhas L. Ketkar & Dilip Ratha, Diaspora Bonds: Tapping the Diaspora During Difficult
Times, in DIASPORA FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 127 (Suhas L. Ketkar & Dilip Ratha eds.,
available
at
2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/4768821157133580628/DfD_FullReport.pdf; Manuel Orozco, Diaporas, Development and Transnational Integration: Ghanaians in the U.S., U.K. and Germany, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
(Oct. 23, 2005), http://w.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Ghanaian%20transnationalism.pdf.
95 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 84.
96

Id.
Vulnerable Employment and Poverty on the Rise, Interview with ILO Chief of EmINT’L
LABOR
ORG.
ONLINE
(Jan.
26,
2010),
ployment
Trends
Unit,
97

http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/insight/WCMS_120470/lang-en/index.htm.
98 A vulnerable (employment) worker is generally defined as “someone working in an
environment where the risk of being denied employment rights is high and who does not have
the capacity or means to protect themselves from that abuse.” U.K. Dep’t of Trade and Indus.,
Success at Work: Protecting Vulnerable Workers, Supporting Good Employers, THE NAT’L
ARCHIVES 25 (Mar. 2006), http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file27469.pdf.
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formal work arrangements or contracts, working conditions are subpar, there is little if any job security, and because most either do not
have access to the formalized legal system or, in fact, no legal system
for worker protection rights may exit, there are very few avenues for
taking retaliatory action against violations of labors rights. According
to an International Labor Organization (ILO) annual report - “Global
Employment Trends 2010” - it was estimated that as a result of the
financial crisis the “share of workers in vulnerable employment
worldwide may have increased by more than 100 million in 2009, and
99
with it global poverty.” Prior to the global financial crisis and subsequent economic and social crisis, “the share of workers in vulnerable
employment was on a downward trend in all regions, decreasing glob100
In
ally by around 4 percentage points between 1998 and 2008.”
2010, “the total number of vulnerable workers worldwide is estimated
at between 1.48 and 1.59 billion - around half of the total global work101
force.” This is an increase in the “number of workers in vulnerable
employment [from approximately] 41.6 [to] 109.5 million from 2008 to
102
2009.”
Monitoring shifts in remittance flows is beginning to play a more
pivotal role in national and global security. It is clear that while domestic financial stress causes many young men to become foreign
103
guest workers, a severe global financial crisis causes these young
men to lose their jobs overseas and forces them to return to their
104
For example,
homes which are invariably in developing countries.

99
100
101
102

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

103
Foreign
Worker
Definition,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_worker (last modified Feb. 11, 2012).

WIKIPEDIA,

A foreign worker is a person who works in a country other than the one of which he or she
is a citizen. The term migrant worker as discussed in the migrant worker page is used in a
particular UN resolution as a synonym for “foreign worker”. In nations that have yet to
ratify this resolution such as the United States the term migrant worker is not synonymous
with foreign worker.
Id. “UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently suggested that the financial crisis could uproot entire communities of foreign workers around the world and cause major changes to the
dynamics of international migration.” Ron Synovitz, Global Financial Crisis Costs Many Migrant Workers Their Jobs, RADIO FREE EUROPE - RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 18, 2008),
http://www.rferl.org/content/Global_Financial_Crisis_Costs_Many_Migrant_Workers_Their_Jo
bs/1361209.html.
104 Francis Calpotura & Debayani Kar, Summary Report for La Liga / TIGRA’s Delegation to WARBE Development Foundation and Partners, TRANSNATIONAL INST. FOR
GRASSROOTS RESEARCH & ACTION (Oct. 2009), http://www.laligaglobal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/10/
BangladeshFinalReport.pdf.
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the Malaysian government rescinded approximately 55,000 Bangla105
deshi men’s work visas in March 2009. Bangladesh has a population
of 150 million, of which twenty million live in the nation’s capital of
Dhaka. The daily wages is just a little more than $2 a day, and 6 million migrant workers are trying to eke a living outside their country of
birth. From Saudi Arabia, Dubai and other countries of West Asia,
along with counterparts in Singapore, Australia and the United States,
these workers sent $9 billion in remittances last year - a full 10% of
the country’s GDP, and is ten times more than Foreign Direct Invest106
ments (FDI) to its industry.
107
Bangladesh is what is known in economics as a fragile state.
108
According to a DFID 2008 Country Governance Analysis report,
“Bangladesh is a fragile state with widespread social and political
marginalisation of the poor, which has the potential to feed into polit109
ical conflict.” The Bangladeshi government was reported as weak in
general, lacking accountability across the board. 110 It was reported
that the weak national governance system mixed with the unstable
political environment has “restricted growth potential and limited
111
With regards to national and
those who benefit from growth.”
global security, high unemployment, low incomes, and fragile states
112
are a volatile combination.
3. Foreign Aid and Security
The issue of foreign aid is a pressure point for overall security.
The international economic crisis means that we are looking at a situation which will probably lead to less money for defense and a wider
security agenda, at a time when the consequences of the economic

105
106

Id.
Id.

107 “‘Fragile states’ is the term used for countries facing particularly severe development
challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these
countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict. Ongoing armed
conflicts affect three out of four fragile states.” Definition of Fragility and Conflict, THE
WORLDBANK,http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/E
XTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22230573~menuPK:4448982~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~the
SitePK:511778,00.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2009).
108 INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE,
DFID’S
PROGRAMME
IN
BANGLADESH,
2009-10,
H.C
.95-I
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmintdev/95/95i.pdf).
109 Id. at 8.
110 Id. at 8-16.
111 Id. at 8.
112 Nato Review, From Finance to Defence: How Did The Financial Crisis Arrive and
Where Will It Lead?, (2009), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/AdrianKendry/EN/index.htm.
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crisis have led to greater social disorder, problems of rising poverty,
tensions that could erupt in certain regions through tribal tensions or
113
tensions to do with further conflict in certain continents, tensions
over food and water and other recourses (oil and gas being the obvious one). This means that “foreign aid and foreign assistance . . . is
114
absolutely crucial” while we face daunting pressures in this arena to
cut back in these programs, so there needs to be serious “international
115
coordination in this field.”
The fact of the matter is that in the absence of foreign aid, the
consequence of what is largely a developed world financial crisis could
be exacerbated well beyond its current limit and into the developing
world. We are already seeing instability arising, we already know
from the World Bank that the number of people who will be impoverished this year will rise by many millions . . . . We will see people dispossessed, people losing not only their livelihoods but also their
homes, we will probably see more patterns of internal migration, all of
this is going to accelerate the competition for resources . . . we have to
take into account a climate change, which is a factor not directly
caused by the economic crisis, but is one of these huge issues which
accompany the economic downturn, and this will mean that the conjunction of these issues could bring about a perfect storm. So if we
don’t respond positively and with the right kind of coordinated approach, then I think we could be heading into some very stormy peri116
ods ahead.
B.

The National Recourses, Security, and Failed States

In addition to trade, remittances, and foreign aid, another explosive mixture with implications for national and global security is the
case of failed states that are highly dependent on natural resources or
117
When these prices spiral downward, standard
commodity exports.
of living and employment is directly impacted, and amidst corruption
and no short- or medium-term growth and career prospects, young
118
It is this type of envimen tend to look for alternative lifestyles.
ronment, which is ripe for the growth of extremism. A prime example
of the explosive mix of distressed economics, national recourses, and
113
114
115
116

Finance, supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.

117 ASHRAF GHANI & CLARE LOCKHART, FIXING FAILED STATES: A FRAMEWORK FOR
REBUILDING A FRACTURED WORLD (2008).
118 ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, & NAWAF E. OBAID, NATIONAL SECURITY IN SAUDI
ARABIA: THREATS, RESPONSES, AND CHALLENGES XXI (2005).
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security is Yemen. Approximately seventy percent of Yemen’s GDP
government revenue comes from oil exports and income from oil con119
stitutes about ninety percent of exports. Rapidly decreasing oil reserves, however, coupled with a fall in global oil prices, have had a
120
“Oil exports in Yemen
severe impact on the Yemeni economy.
have declined sharply in recent years, from more than 450,000 barrels
per day at the peak in 2003 to roughly 280,000 barrels per day in January 2009, according to Amir Salem al-Aidroos, the minister of oil
121
and minerals.” While any direct correlation is difficult to make, this
was about the same time (January 2009) that Yemeni militants announced the local creation of “Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula”
122
(AQAP). AQAP has declared itself as a militant Islamist organiza123
Within
tion and is primarily active in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
almost exactly the same timeframe, January 2009, the Saudi Arabian
government made public its list of eighty-five of its most wanted mili124
tants living around the world. The majority of them were based in
Yemen. “Barring any major new discoveries, energy experts generously estimate that Yemen’s oil exports will cease in ten years. The
World Bank posits that by 2017 the government of Yemen will earn
no income from oil. Other assessments suggest that the proved oil
125
reserves will be exhausted in just five years.”
C.

Financial Crisis Impact in Post-Conflict and Conflict
Countries

Yet another danger of a financial crisis of this magnitude is the
potential to be a trigger for post-conflict countries to lapse back into
126
“Post-conflict
conflict or perpetuate conflict in a conflict zone.

119 MENAP Oil Exporters: Benefiting from High Oil Prices Amid Growing Risks, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, 14 (2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/mcd/eng/pdf/
oilexporters.pdf; Geopolitics and the Arab Spring in the Gulf, WORDPRESS (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://saudirevolt.wordpress.com/2011/09/27/yemen-hdi-gdp-per-capita-comparisons/;
Martin
Plaut, Yemen ‘Faces Crisis as Oil Ends’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
7739402.stm.
120 Christopher Boucek, Yemem: Avoiding a Downward Spiral, CARNEGIE PAPERS (Sept.
2009), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf.
121 Id.
122 Jonathan Masters, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.
123 Id.
124 Kingdom Unveils List of 85 Wanted Militants Abroad, ARAB NEWS (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=118850&d=3&m=2&y=2009.
125 BOUCEK, supra note 120.
126 Alemayehu Geda, Capacity Building In Fragile And Post-Conflict States In Africa, 7
WORLD JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MGMT., AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 217 (2011).
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countries” are defined by the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) as
(i) a country that has suffered from a severe and long-lasting conflict, which has led to inactivity of the borrower for an extended
period of, or at least a substantial decline in the level of external
assistance, including from IDA; (ii) a country that has experienced a short, but highly intensive, conflict leading to a disruption of IDA involvement; and (iii) a newly sovereign state that
has emerged through the violent break-up of a former sovereign
127
entity.
The simple answer is “yes” to the question of whether financial
crisis has further damaged conflict zones and lapsed post-conflict
countries back into conflict. We are seeing it in southern Sudan and
other African countries that are oil exporters or are natural resource
dependent for growth as demand for minerals and copper decline due
128
All this in turn increases the deto the decline in global growth.
129
But one has to be very cautious as “each [postpendency on aid.
conflict] country has a tipping point [that is different for] when these
problems get so severe that they lapse back into conflict.” 130
One thing is clear, that within the post-conflict and conflict
131
states, the mindset of the population is fragile. “Long periods of
fragility and conflict that are accompanied by economic stagnation
usually leave the population mindset [where] . . . life is a zero-sum
132
game - the only way they can go up is if others go down.” This becomes especially true in the national and regional politics of these
133
countries. This mindset does not allow for cooperative politics but
rather competitive politics, i.e. a power struggle.134 It should be added:
“during periods of internal conflicts and state fragility, governments
127

Definition of Fragility and Conflict, supra note 107.
Angus Deaton & Ron Miller, International Commodity Prices, Macroeconomics Performance, and Politics and Sub-Sahara Africa, 79 PRINCETON STUD. IN INT’L FIN. (1995), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~deaton/downloads/International_Commodity_Prices.pdf.
129 Id.
130 Financial Crisis, supra note 57.
128

131 The International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) database on armed conflict
defines events resulting in more than 25 battle-deaths per year as minor conflicts; events resulting in more than 1,000 battle-deaths are defined as major conflicts. Definition of Fragility and
Conflict, supra note 107. Research such as the Armed Conflict Database also differentiates
between international conflicts, intrastate conflicts (civil wars) and one-sided violence by state
and non-state actors. Id.
132 Podcast Interview with Paul Collier on Financial Crisis, NATO REVIEW
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Paul-Collier/EN/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 2011).
133
134

Id.
Id.
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are typically very corrupt. And so the politicians that flourish in those
environments are basically the crooks and crocks, and people with a
mindset of the zero-sum game typically dominate the populations of
135
politics in the early post-conflicts settings.” “So you need a decade
of good growth before mindsets can move on to realizing that they’re
scope of cooperation and not just a zero-sum game, it can be a posi136
tive-sum game.”
So . . . the economy leads the politics -- and perhaps it’s been a
big mistake of international policy and an illusion to think that
the politics could lead the way. Of course, [you have to have]
enough politics and enough security so you get order first . . . it is
not possible to build the economy in conditions of serious securi137
ty disorder.
Prolonged and deep global financial crisis, as the one we are experiencing in the West, ultimately pushes post-conflict countries back
into conflict and perpetuates conflict in conflict-ridden zones.
V. FINANCIAL CRISIS, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
It is important to emphasize that the scale and magnitude of the
financial crisis has been such that security threats have also emerged
138
in developed western economies.
There is an abundance of evidence that growth of extremism during the global financial meltdown
and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis is not limited to the
139
This has especially been true in Europe where
developing world.
far-right-wing parties are making electoral gains in several European
140
countries. Many of these gains are based on anti-Muslim and antiimmigrant platforms amidst severe economic austerity measures im141
plemented in the wake of the financial crisis. Stagnating economic
growth, rising unemployment, and social benefits being cut, have led
142
For example, in
voters to lose faith in their conventional parties.
June 2010, European Union parliamentary elections, far right extremist parties gained an alarming amount of the popular vote in a number
of European Union countries, such as, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
135
136
137

Id.
Id.
Id.
Tackling

138
EU’s Security Threats, EURO. COMMISSION
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/frontpage/2010/1003_en.htm.
139

(Nov.

22,

2010),

Id.

140

Deepa Kumar, Threat of the Far Right in Europe, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Oct. 7,
2010), http://socialistworker.org/2010/10/07/threat-of-the-right-in-europe.
141
142

Id.
Id.
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Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania,
143
and Slovakia. A specific case, for example, is the United Kingdom,
where the “the British National Party (BNP), which has its roots in
fascist parties of the past, got almost a million votes and its first two
144
seats in the European parliament.” This is evident in domestic Eu145
For example, in Sweden, “the party of
ropean elections as well.
Jimmie Akesson, the Sweden Democrats, gained power in the parliament running on blatantly anti-Muslim campaigns. Akesson called
for restricting immigration, stating that Islam is the greatest threat
146
facing the Swedish nation,” and in Holland, “the PVV won 24 seats
147
in the Dutch general elections in 2010,” while in Switzerland, two
right of centre parties (Swiss People's Party and the Federal Demo148
As economic conditions
cratic Union) have gained popularity.
worsen while the Eurozone leaders struggle to contain the crisis, the
United States Department of Homeland Security has become increasingly concerned about the security on two fronts in Europe. First, the
conditions have ripened and are conducive to the recruitment by right
149
wing extremist groups, and second, they believe that there is an extremely elevated risk of small terrorist homegrown cells becoming
150
active. The Department of Homeland Security believes this threat
is the highest within the last decade. The latter they believe to be true
151
in the United States as well.
The United States is far from immune to this. The far right parties in the United States are in close collaboration with their Europe152
an counterparts. For example, the Tea Party has adopted some of
its rhetoric from European far right parties, and, in fact, learned a
valuable lesson watching European elections - that within “the con143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

147 In the 2010 general election, the Dutch right-wing Party for Freedom (Dutch: Partij
voor de Vrijheid, PVV) won 24 seats, making it the third largest party. Id.
148
149

Id.
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150 KRISTIN ARCHICK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33166, MUSLIMS IN EUROPE:
PROMOTING INTEGRATION AND COUNTERING EXTREMISM (Sept. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf.
151 JEROME BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41416, AMERICAN JIHADIST
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fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.
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text of a prolonged economic crisis, racism and the politics of scape153
Generally,
goating can enable them to reach a wider audience.”
right-wing extremism is being fueled by the current financial and ensuing economic crisis and has resulted in a resurgence of radicaliza154
tion and recruitment.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: GREATEST DANGER FOR SECURITY
EMANATING FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Perhaps the most distinct and impending threat to national security is the notion that democracy, capitalism, and market economies
(the Western ideal) are the best path to economic development. This
premise is being severely challenged because of the current global
financial crisis, which has exposed “the prospect of an unsustainable
debt burden, unprecedented federal budget deficits, the success of
mixed economies with both state-owned and private business, huge
imbalances in international trade and capital flows, and high unem155
ployment.” It is because of this that United States’ economic recovery is crucial, as
one consequence of the economic crisis is that market economies
have lost much of their luster, and the United States has lost
much of its credibility in this realm. [And this only. . .] adds to
the importance that the U.S. economy get back on track, lest the
lasting casualty of the crisis be the perception of modern capital156
ism itself.
Developing and emerging market countries are looking at the
China model with some envy (even the United States is adopting
more centralized approach in its crisis management with more gov157
We may worry about
ernment intervention and industrial policy).
ideology - but others who are not developed yet - worry first and
foremost about economic success and, second, ideology.
Traditionally the focus, strategy, and desire of western countries
have been to use democracy as the method to transform fragile states

153

Id.

154

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, supra note
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NANTO, supra note 75.

149.
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Security Challenges Arising from the Global Financial Crisis Before the H. Comm. on
Armed Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard N. Haass, President, Council on
Foreign Relations).
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158
to functioning ones. However, given the severity and destruction of
the ongoing financial crisis on the wealth and ideology of western systems and institutions, the long-term impact on security could be far
more damaging than just economic growth rates or standard of living
issues. Thomas P.M. Barnett in his book “Great Powers: America
159
and the World after Bush” advocates that the United States should
“go slow on politics (multiparty democracy) while getting our way on
160
The subtle presthe economics (expanding world middle class).”
sure to shift away from focusing more on the political system in place
and instead focusing on growing a middle class to keep society functioning (i.e. focus on the economic growth) effectively resonates with
161
the notion of “forget democracy, build the economy.” This pressure
to shift is not only due to the security benefits yielded by stable economic growth and a large middle class, but also the “trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and spending to
162
provide jobs and income to citizens at home.”
This might resonate as an enhanced United States’ policy shift
that better serves us domestically and internationally given the economic devastation of the financial crisis, but one must keep in mind
that China is already the greatest sponsor of this philosophy . . . and
the emerging market economies are listening by example. From a
United States’ security standpoint, this is perhaps the most dangerous
outcome of the current financial crisis.
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Michael Fullilove, Forget Democracy, Build the Economy, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2009),
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in WASH. POST).
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